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Abstract
Recently a wide and empirically-backed consensus has emerged arguing that
direct democratic control over government’s spending decisions through initiatives
and referenda constrains government size. But what happens if budgetary matters
are excluded from the voters’ right of the initiative? I study this question by ex-
tending the analysis to German direct democracy reforms of the mid-1990s, which
granted voters wide opportunities to initiate referenda on local issues, but neither
the right, nor the responsibility of voting on the implied costs of these initiatives.
By exploiting a novel dataset containing detailed information on close to 2,300 voter
initiatives in the population of around 13,000 German municipalities from 2002 to
2009, I show that in this sample – and in contrast to the Swiss and US evidence
– direct democracy causes an expansion of local government size by up to 8% in
annual per capita expenditure and revenue per observed initiative (on economic
projects). The main empirical challenge is the endogeneity of voters’ unobserved
preferences which simultaneously determine both their propensity towards exploit-
ing their direct democracy rights and their preferences for local public policies. To
address this issue I use state- and municipality-varying legislative thresholds on the
minimum number of signatures required to initiate referenda and the time to collect
these signatures as strong and exogenous instruments for observed initiatives.
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1 Introduction
Whether and how direct democracy affects government size is a non-trivial question. The
practice of delegating a part of the decision-making power from elected representatives
directly to voters through mid-election initiatives and referenda1 on single-issued topics
implies serious changes to the political process that determines the equilibrium economic
and fiscal policies. In an ideal median voter world competition between politicians (the
agent) should drive the bundle of government policies to the point preferred by the
median voter (the principal). Public choice scholars, however, argue that the government
has a systematic over-spending bias because of the influence of bureaucrats’ detrimental
incentives, lobbying by special interest groups, log-rolling in the legislature or all sorts of
other principal-agent problems (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980).
Direct citizen approval of spending decisions via referenda has been for long viewed as
one mechanism of the fiscal constitution that constrains the government’s inherent over-
spending bias (Romer and Rosenthal, 1979), for example, by bringing actual policies closer
in line with the fiscally more conservative preferences of the median voter (Peltzman,
1992). Even more so for the right of the initiative, which, by granting citizens wider
opportunities to set the political agenda, further shifts the power to voters themselves,
thus alleviating the principal-agent problems. This logic is then extended to a broader
umbrella term – direct democracy – with an empirically-backed consensus that direct
democracy negatively affects government size (Kirchga¨ssner, 2000).
This paper argues that this relatively broad consensus does not capture the complete
story. First, the evidence is based on the experience of a few countries – the US, Switzer-
land and more recently also on Sweden2 – and thus critically depends on their distinct
1The word referendum derives from the Latin verb “referre” meaning to refer, I therefore use its
Latin plural form referenda rather than the English plural referendums. Both forms, however, are
grammatically not incorrect and can be used according to the user’s preference.
2Among others Zax (1989); Farnham (1990); Matsusaka (1995); Camobreco (1998); Matsusaka (2000);
Bails and Tieslau (2000); Besley and Case (2003); Blomberg et al. (2004); Marschall and Ruhil (2005);
Primo (2010); Salvino et al. (2012) for the United States; Pommerehne (1978); Feld and Kirchga¨ssner
(2001); Feld and Matsusaka (2003); Funk and Gathmann (2011) for Switzerland; and Hinnerich and
Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) for Sweden.
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systems of fiscal governance. This lack-of-generality argument is especially worrisome,
because often direct democratic institutions are more applied at state- and local- lev-
els where the cross-country heterogeneity in fiscal institutions becomes more apparent
than at the national-level. More importantly, however, I argue that the institutions of
direct democracy are decisively different.3 As much as it is odd to compare representa-
tive democracies without looking at the relevant institutional differences, it is likewise
problematic to use the broad term of direct democracy as a simple universal institution.
Against this background, this paper pioneers to extend the analysis to Germany4 –
a compelling case of comparison – where in the mid-1990s its states, the La¨nder, have
independently gone through a series of reforms introducing non-identical institutions of
direct democracy at the local level. As a result, now all German municipalities allow
for the right of the voter initiative. The critical difference of German direct democratic
institutions to that of Swiss or US ones is that the constitutions of all German states
share the common property of the so called fiscal-taboo, i.e. initiatives directly related to
municipal budgets are prohibited by all state constitutions. This is critical to the devel-
oped mechanism on how direct democracy affects fiscal outcomes, because, as discussed
above, it is precisely the citizens’ right to veto the government’s spending decisions that
serves as the mechanism to constrain its over-spending bias. Now, what happens if voters
are granted the right to set the agenda and directly vote on projects of their own choice
– including ones relevant for the economy and, thus, indirectly to the fiscal system as
3Recent attempts to distinguish between cross-country differences in direct democratic institutions
are made by Blume et al. (2009) and Blume and Voigt (2012). Among other things, the latter study
finds that the right of referenda at the national level is negatively correlated to government spending,
while initiatives have an opposite relation. Freitag and Vatter (2006) make a distinction between fiscal
referenda and initiatives in the Swiss context, and find that only the former matter for taxation-related
outcomes.
4There are two recent exceptions. Firstly, Blume et al. (2011) compares local government expenditures
in the state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg to that of the neighboring state of Bayern exploiting the fact that
direct democracy was introduced at different time points in the two states. The study, however, remains
descriptive in nature due to the small number of observations, as the local level fiscal data is aggregated
to state level. Also, the heterogeneity of direct democratic institutions of the two states – a fact I
show later in the paper – makes them hard to compare. Secondly, Asatryan et al. (2013) and Asatryan
et al. (2014) address many of the empirical concerns by presenting quasi-experimental evidence on,
respectively, spending- and taxation- related effects of initiatives. However the paper concentrates only
on one German state, Bayern. Both studies find that in their given samples direct democracy expands
local government size.
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well – but neither having the right, nor the responsibility of voting on the implied costs
of these initiatives?
Surprisingly, this property has discouraged economists from doing any research on
understanding the budgetary effects of German direct democratic institutions, possibly
assuming that the fiscal-taboo by definition implies irrelevance of the initiatives for the
budgets. On the contrary, this paper exploits a novel dataset5 containing detailed infor-
mation on close to 2300 voter initiatives that took place in the universe of around 13,000
German municipalities from 2002 to 2009 to study their effect on local public finances.
To address the well-recognized endogeneity between direct democratic activity and local
public policies (e.g. Marschall and Ruhil (2005); Funk and Gathmann (2011); Asatryan
et al. (2013)), I use state- and municipality-varying legislative thresholds on the mini-
mum number of signatures required to initiate referenda and the time to collect these
signatures (as well as other differences in state legislations) as exogenous predictors of
observed initiatives to build an instrumental variable identification.
Unlike the seeming irrelevance of these initiatives for fiscal performance, the results
indicate that in my sample – and in contrast to the Swiss and US evidence – direct
democracy causes an expansion of local government size amounting to an average increase
of up to 8% in annual per capita expenditure and revenue per initiative on economic
issues. I also show, that this expansion of government size is (at least partly) financed
by increased local tax rates (on property and local businesses) and not through budget
deficits.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 I discuss the Ger-
man direct democracy reforms, and since these are being analyzed for the first time, I
go in some detail to present descriptive evidence on the cross-state differences in these
5By stressing this innovation, I aim at inviting researchers’ attention to the many interesting features
of this new database. The large number of observations combined with quite substantial variations both
in direct democratic institutions and in the intensity, types, topics, timing (and other details) of observed
initiatives and referenda should make the data useful not only in different branches of economics (public
economics, political economics, urban and regional economics etc), but also relevant for scientists working
in other fields such as political science, law, governance, public administration, electoral studies etc.
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institutions. In subsequent Section 3 I describe the data and develop the identification
strategy. Section 4 presents the results, followed by conclusions in Section 5.
2 German Institutions of Direct Democracy
At least for the post World War II period, Germany has not been too famous for its direct
democratic institutions. And rightfully so: Although the first German democratic consti-
tution of the Weimar Republic (1918-1919) included various elements of direct democracy
(Schiller, 2011), the multiple uses of plebiscites in 1934, 1936 and 1938 by the Nazi dic-
tatorship to legitimize their draconian power discredited the concept of direct democracy
for the decades to come (Schiller, 2011). As a result the new post-war constitution of the
Federal Republic of Germany, the “Grundgesetz”, was almost purely representative6, and
to date there has not been any practice of direct democracy on the national level (Eder
et al., 2009). On the sub-national levels, the constitutions in seven states (all Western)
allowed for some - although very restrictive - elements of direct democracy (Setala and
Schiller, 2012), while at the municipal level laws of state-imposed direct democracy were
virtually non-existent.78
The years 1989-1990 and the peaceful collapse of Communism in Eastern Germany
mark a turning point. Since German reunification most La¨nder adopted or liberalized
their direct democracy laws on the state level, and all La¨nder have independently gone
through a series of reforms introducing non-identical institutions of direct democracy
at the local level. In today’s practice it seems direct democracy is becoming part of
Germany’s political scene - a fact, I argue, largely neglected in the economics profession.
The former East German states, motivated to rebuild their institutions of participa-
tory democracy, were the first to grant their citizens the right of local-level initiatives
6Except for a mandatory referendum for territorial changes.
7The only exception is the state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, where the right to initiate referenda was
introduced to municipal law in 1956.
8To avoid confusion, throughout the study I will use the German names of the states rather than
their English translations.
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and referenda.9 The Western states followed,10 however, with quite a different motiva-
tion. Here the innovation was largely determined by the need to reform the local public
administration towards strengthening its efficiency in the new competitive environment,
and was undertaken parallel to other administrative reforms (Wollmann, 2000).
A remarkable case was the direct democratic reform in Bayern. Rather than a change
imposed by politicians, here the reform came bottom-up through the right of the citizen
initiative at the state level. Despite significant barriers, a popular mobilization in 1995
collected nearly 1.2 million signatures comfortably passing the requirements to initiate
a state-wide referendum11 demanding direct democracy at the local level. The initiative
was implemented as a referendum later that year collecting 57.8% “Yes” votes (Verhulst
and Nijeboer, 2008). Due to its strong roots, the Bavarian direct democratic institutions
turned out to be one of the most comprehensive ones among German states both in terms
of their legislative openness and their exhaustive usage in practice. Citizens of the state
of Hamburg in 1998 and those of Thu¨ringen in 2009 went through a similar path by
exploiting their right of the initiative at the state level to introduce and reform direct
democracy at the local level. Non-coincidentally, the latter two states ended up with
quite strong direct democratic institutions too.
These cross-state historical differences in their paths to direct democracy imply inter-
esting variations in their direct democratic institutions. I summarize the most relevant
ones in Table 1. The most usual instrument of direct democracy, present in all states,
is the right of the citizen-initiative (“Bu¨rgerbegehren”) that voters can launch on an
issue within the competencies of the municipality. If the given amount of signatures (the
thresholds are presented in columns 2-3 of Table 1) are collected within the maximum al-
lowed time (column 6), the initiative is implemented as a referendum (“Bu¨rgerentscheid”)
which is then additionally subject to certain quorum requirements (columns 4-5). Most,
9Including Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thu¨ringen in
1990-1993, and Berlin later in 2005.
10Including Bayern, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz
and Saarland in 1993-1998, Schleswig-Holstein earlier in 1990, and Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, as noted, in
1956.
11Around 900,000 signatures (10% threshold) were to be collected in two weeks time.
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but not all, states also allow for the council-initiative (“Ratsreferendum”), which is a
referendum called by city councils (on average about a tenth of all initiatives). Regard-
ing the topics, all states - as discussed earlier and one of the focal points of this paper -
exclude the possibility of initiatives directly concerning the municipal budgets (i.e. the
fiscal-taboo), and have different lists of other prohibited topics (the so called off-limits
issues). In addition some states restrict the topics of initiatives by a catalogue of allowed
issues (positive-topics : column 8), and all states with the exclusion of Bayern and the
city-state of Bremen require to submit a cost recovery proposal with the initiative. These
differences suggest a great deal of variation in the actual use of observed initiatives and
referenda (columns 10-11).
Most notably in Bayern, the liberal direct democratic institutions12 adopted in 1995
imply the highest number of observed initiatives (around 900 for the period between
2002 to 2009) and the highest rate of success of 47% (Figure 1). In contrast, its Western
neighbor Baden-Wu¨rttemberg13 of around the same size, where direct democracy has
been in place decades earlier (since 1956), but with much tighter regulations, hosted only
203 initiatives in the same period.
Regarding the topics of initiatives, it seems people are most concerned when it comes
to securing general public services. As shown by Figure 2 almost every second initiative
is about infrastructural projects such as transportation, basic supply of water, energy
and other utilities, and, importantly, also including social infrastructure such as health,
education or other facilities under municipal discretion. The second most frequently
observed category are the economic issues with over a quarter of all initiatives. Given the
fiscal-taboo, these are again initiatives to secure the desired amount of local public goods
- often with no necessary consideration of their implied costs for the local budgets - and
include topics such as contra-privatization proposals, blocking the construction of various
economic projects such as energy plants, mobile-phone towers, shopping centers etc. The
12Low signature and quorum thresholds, unlimited time for signature collection, absence of a cost
recovery proposal requirement, relatively broad areas where initiatives are allowed etc.
13With higher quorum thresholds, a few weeks of time for signature collection, cost recovery proposal
requirement, wide restrictions on topics of initiatives etc.
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proposed direct costs of initiatives are often not too high - on average ranging from
14,000 Euros in Sachsen-Anhalt to over 155,000 Euros in Nordrhein-Westfalen (column
9 of Table 1) - and they are certainly not higher for economic initiatives (Figure 2). The
indirect losses, however, such as through unrealized private sector investments, may imply
certain costs to the local budgets. On the other hand, as discussed in the introduction the
right of the initiative gives the voters the tool to act as a watchdog against bureaucrats’
possible failures in designing and implementing fiscal policies. This is the main dilemma
I will face throughout the paper.
3 Data and Identification
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the population of 12,000 to 13,000 German
municipalities across 12 of its 16 states for the period between 2002 and 2009. The
city-states of Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg, as well as the small state of Saarland are
excluded from the analysis.14 For the resulting sample I collect town-level information
on the observed initiatives, and also data on municipal fiscal and other characteristics.
Table 2 provides complete summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis.
First regarding the data on direct democracy, I collect state-level information on direct
democratic institutions from the respective state constitutions. The previous section
has a detailed discussion on these institutions, which are summarized in Table 1. This
institutional data is then complemented by a novel dataset on the actual usage of direct
democratic tools, i.e. data on the observed initiatives (including information on the date
these were implemented, their type, the proposed cost that these initiatives would imply,
their topic and the result) for the population of German towns.
Concerning municipal characteristics, my main fiscal variables of interest are: total
annual per capita expenditure and revenue in real terms; local budget deficits as share of
14I exclude these from the sample for two reasons: first because very few initiatives have been observed
here; and secondly, regarding the city-states, initiatives are implemented either on city- (same as state)
or city-district- levels, both being incomparable to municipalities.
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budget revenues; and the two sorts of taxes over which municipalities have full discretion
to decide the rate and the base, thus their main source of autonomous income other
than borrowing. These taxes include local multiplier on the business tax and on the
property tax (with two different A and B rates respectively applied on agricultural land
and all other property). A standard set of control variables are also employed including:
level of total population, share of working age population and share of unemployed as
demographic statistics, and share of the sum of left- and right- leaning delegates at local
councils to control for ideological differences.
I am interested to study the causal effect of direct democracy on local fiscal outcomes.
The regression on fiscal outcomes takes the following form:
FiscalV arit = α1 + δ ·DirectDemocracyit + β1 · Controlsit + µ1c + η1t + 1it, (1)
where the dependent variable FiscalV ar is the fiscal variable of interest as specified above
(i.e. expenditure, revenue, taxes, or deficit). On the right hand side, Controls is a set of
standard demographic and political controls again listed above, and DirectDemocracy
is a binary variable indicating whether an initiative has taken place in municipality i in
year t. µ and η are county and year dummies,15 and  is an unobserved error term.
Now, the main challenge is to solve the obvious endogeneity between direct democracy
activity and local fiscal policies. Such endogeneity arises, for example, because of vot-
ers’ preferences that simultaneously determine both their propensity towards exploiting
their rights given by direct democracy laws and their preferences for local fiscal policies.
Obviously, I can not control for such bias in Equation 1, since voters’ preferences, as
in the example, are unobserved and, thus, are included in the error term violating its
15Counties are a unit of organization one step higher than the towns and are equivalent to the European
NUTS3 classification. They are defined either on the level of individual cities (“Kreisfreie Stadt”) or,
in rural areas, on the level of counties including several towns (“Landkreis”). Since the smaller towns
united in counties are likely to have the common unobservables, I control for unobserved heterogeneity
on the level of counties (around 400) rather than for each municipality (over 12,000).
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independence assumption. As shown by Asatryan et al. (2013) causality might well be
problematic as well, since voters do not have to wait until the next elections anymore,
but can directly react to government policies (e. g. changes in the level of spending or
taxation) with opting for more or less initiatives.
I solve this endogeneity problem by the means of a two stage instrumental variable
identification strategy. The first-stage specification, where the latent DirectDemocracy*
variable is regressed on a set of exogenous instruments and all of the previous regressors
(including the fixed effects), takes the following form:
DirectDemocracy∗it = α2 + γ · Institutionsit + β2 · Controlsit + µ2c + η2t + 2it, (2)
DirectDemocracyit =
 1, if DirectDemocracy
∗
it > 0
0, otherwise
where the new Institutions variable is a set of exogenous variables capturing state-
imposed direct democratic institutions, including: a dummy on the presence of a list of
positive-topics in state constitutions; the maximum allowed time (in weeks) to collect
signatures for initiating citizen-initiatives; and also the minimum requirement for the
number of signatures to be collected and, likewise, the quorum thresholds on the number
of casted eligible votes for the referenda to be approved. All these institutional character-
istics should be relevant for the likelihood of an initiative (non-zero covariance between
DirectDemocracy and Institutions), therefore, I will use these institutions as instru-
ments for initiatives. For my identification to be valid, it is essential that these variables
are exogenous to the frequency of observed initiatives. This is clearly the case, because
of three reasons: first, these laws were adopted well before the period of analysis and
mainly in the mid-1990s, but in some cases as early as 1956 (Table 1); second and more
importantly, the laws are adopted at the state-level – and not by the local governments
– either by the state parliaments or through popular referenda at the state-level such as
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in Bayern in 1995; third, these laws also contain some degree of randomness in certain
neighborhoods - the signature and quorum thresholds, for example, not only vary by
state but also by towns within states depending on (quasi-randomly) selected population
thresholds at round numbers (Asatryan et al., 2013).
Thus I have a set of instruments that satisfy the exogeneity assumption, but also im-
portantly have a good deal of variation as they vary both by- and within- states, and also
over-time (because of (state-level) changes in institutions and (town-level) population
growth or decline). For the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator to be consistent, as
usual, I further assume that there is no perfect linear relationship between the instru-
ments, and that the error term of Equation 1 has a zero mean and is uncorrelated with
any of the instruments. For asymptotic efficiency, I report standard errors that are robust
to heteroskedasticity of unknown form.
4 Results
The current section starts by presenting the results from the first-stage regression on the
determinants of initiatives and referenda. This is essential in identifying the instruments,
which I will then use to estimate the causal effect of direct democracy on local government
aggregate size and on the budget items in detail. The discussion of results ends with
several robustness tests.
4.1 First-Stage Results: Determinants of Initiatives
Table 3 presents results from estimating Equation 2 using an OLS approach in columns
1-8 (since both stages of the 2SLS are OLS) and a probit regression in columns 9-10 (to
account for the non-linearity coming from the binary nature of the dependent variable). In
the first three specifications the dependent variable measuring direct democracy activity
is initiative (a total amount of 2288 over the whole sample): first, in the baseline case, it
is regressed on two of the instruments without controls (note that column 1 is estimated
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on a much larger set of observations, due to missing values in the control and fiscal
variables), then adding the controls, and in column 3 with the whole set of institutional
variables. For robustness, in the subsequent columns I also introduce alternative variables
of direct democracy, namely: economic-initiative and infrastructure-initiative - initiatives
on the given topics of interest (about 27% and 45% of initiatives respectively); citizen-
initiative - an initiative initiated by the citizens (about 88% of initiatives); council-
initiative - an initiative initiated through the local council and not by citizens (about 11%
of initiatives);16 and referendum - a citizen- or council- initiative that has successfully
gone through the legal procedure and was put to vote - (about 35% of initiatives).
Importantly for my identification, the results on the hypothesized instruments are
strong and robust, and have the expected signs: higher signature requirements are signif-
icantly correlated with fewer initiatives and referenda; longer signature collection periods
are associated with more initiatives and referenda;17 and the presence of a positive list
of allowed topics in state laws are related to fewer initiatives. The latter behaves as ex-
pected, however it has a small variance due to within-state homogeneity. The coefficient
on the quorum requirement is negative as expected, but is not significant again possibly
due to small variance. The signature requirement and the signature collection time, on
the other hand, seem to be quite strong and robust determinants of observed initiatives
and referenda. Thus, I will employ these two as the main instruments for the second-stage
regressions.
Other than the institutional determinants of direct democratic activity, it is also inter-
esting to observe that the size of the town, the share of unemployed and the share of kids
and pensioners are all positively correlated with the number of initiatives. Local gov-
ernment expenditures is also among the positive and robust determinants of initiatives,
16The results on the council-initiative can be viewed as a placebo test, since the city councils are
not subject to these legal constraints and have other procedures for initiating referenda. As expected,
column 7 of Table 3 shows null results for both of the instruments.
17Note that I take the inverse of the collection time variable, since some states in the sample (e.g.
Bayern) do not have such restrictions, so a zero means unlimited time.
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suggesting that addressing the issues of endogeneity and reverse causality are of crucial
importance.
4.2 Main Results: Direct Democracy and Government Size
The reduced form results of the 2SLS estimation of the effects of direct democracy on
local government size as specified in Equations 1 and 2 are presented in Tables 4 and
5. Initiatives have a significantly positive impact on both government expenditure and
revenue. The size of the effect amounts to an average of around 1.5% increase in both
per capita expenditure and revenue per observed initiative.18 Since it may take some
time until the fiscal system realizes the effects of initiatives, in columns 5-8 and 9-12
of both tables I also specify the direct democracy dummies respectively with first and
second lags. The results are robust to specification. Likewise, for the referendum dummy
- which indicates the initiatives that were put to vote - the coefficient is larger as expected
since the scale of the effect is net of the failed initiatives.
The results become stronger in size when I differentiate the initiatives according to their
topics: initiatives broadly defined to be economic projects (that make around 27% of all
initiatives) on average have a twice larger impact on government size than the initiatives
categorized to be on infrastructure including social and educational institutions, but also
projects on transportation and on all other local infrastructure (that make around 45%
of all initiatives). At first sight, this may seem somewhat surprising as the infrastructural
projects are on average more costly (around 65,000 Euros per initiative according to the
cost recovery proposal) than the economic projects (less than 40,000 Euros). However,
as I argue throughout the paper, it is possible that the direct costs of the initiatives (in
any case quite low for both categories as an average town spends around 15 million Euros
annually) are outweighed by indirect losses due to, for example, unrealized private sector
investments - a discussion to which I come back in the conclusions.
18Although some state- and size- dependent differences exist, typically German municipalities are
responsible for the provision of important public goods to citizens such as kindergartens, elementary
schools, utility and infrastructure facilities, local streets, athletic areas, basic health care etc.
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4.3 To Borrow or to Tax?
Next I extend the discussion and ask how is this quite substantial increase in government
size (of up to 6-8% of per capita expenditure and revenue on average per economic initia-
tive) financed? As described above German municipalities have quite wide expenditure
duties, however these are only partly financed locally, the rest being covered through in-
tensive federal and state equalization schemes (by both block and special purpose grants).
The two important sources of local autonomous revenue are: first, the borrowing option
subject to certain fiscal constrains; and, secondly, the tax on property and the trade tax
on local businesses.19 The revenue from own taxes, according to Table 7, on average
make up around 18% of local budget revenue, a significant share being raised through
the local business tax and to lesser extent through the property tax on real estate (type
B property).20
In Table 6 I estimate similar regressions as before,21 but as the dependent variable
taking the local tax rates on property and businesses (columns 1-4 and 5-8) and the
local budget surplus or deficit (columns 9-12).22 As before economic initiatives seem to
matter the most, and the evidence points to the direction that increased government size
is financed through an increase of local tax rates and not through deficit-spending. Quite
the contrary, initiatives even increase the budget surplus.
The latter results on budget balances are consistent with the evidence both from
Switzerland and the US. Feld and Kirchga¨ssner (2001) find that budget deficits and
public debt are lower in municipalities which have the right of referenda, arguing that
the people themselves appear to care more about fiscal discipline than their elected rep-
resentatives. Similarly, Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996) show for a panel of the US States
19The tax bases are uniformly defined nationwide but municipalities have complete independence in
deciding the tax rate by setting a tax multiplier.
20Property tax type-A is applied on agricultural land, which raises less than 1% of total revenue
property, thus, I neglect it in the analysis.
21To preserve space, from now on I will only report the first-lagged results.
22And not data on debt since, although preferred, stock data on local government borrowing for this
large sample is not available.
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that the referendum requirement poses a strong restriction on the issuance of guaranteed
debt.
The results on tax rates are fairly important too, as the two considered property and
business taxes yield significant revenues for the local budget while being one of the few
policy tools that are completely under the local authorities’ discretion. These results
are also interesting in the sense that there is not much evidence on tax related effects of
direct democracy, even from countries where direct democracy is a much more evolved
and functioning institution than in Germany. One exception is Feld and Kirchga¨ssner
(1999). Although the paper finds that Swiss cities with budgetary referenda spend less (a
rather general result for direct democracy), they at the same time have higher tax rates
and also a higher share of revenue from taxes and user charges, as opposed to transfers
and subsidies.
In my context this evidence may imply that voters are demanding more public goods
by exploiting their right of the initiative, but, importantly, are not reluctant to internalize
(at least part of) the costs of providing these additional units of local public goods.
4.4 Structure of the Budget
In this sub-section I re-estimate the 2SLS regressions on the structure of local expen-
ditures and revenues. The reduced-form estimates are summarized in Table 8. These
additional regressions strongly support my previous findings, as the positive and signifi-
cant results are robust to most items of the local budget.
One interesting exception emerges. Expenditure on personnel, which take around 16%
- a fairly significant share - of municipal spending, is negatively affected by initiatives
(column 4). Consistent with this evidence, Matsusaka (2009) shows that the right of the
initiative is associated both with employment and wage cuts of public sector employees.
Based on theory and data from US cities, Matsusaka (2009) then argues that the initiative
process enables individuals and groups outside the government to check the behavior
of elected officials, who often tend to pad the public payroll with patronage workers.
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Similarly, Frey et al. (2001), based on labor force survey data from Switzerland, find
that public employees receive lower financial compensation under more direct democratic
institutions.
This exception may serve as another step in understanding the main question studies in
this paper: why is the fiscal-taboo so important, and why does it reverse the fiscal effects
of direct democracy? The initiatives that could potentially affect the local expenditure
on personnel are not considered as directly budget-related - but rather take the form of
initiatives on, for example, government reform (Figure 2: around 10% of all initiatives
and almost always with zero proposed costs) - and, thus, are not restricted by the fiscal-
taboo even though they obviously have non-zero implications for the budget. Since the
mechanism described by Matsusaka (2009) on how initiatives constrain public spending
employment and wages is similar to the more general channel between direct democracy
and government size, it become logical to expect that it is precisely the fiscal-taboo that
drives the opposite results between the different items (personnel expenditure vs. others)
of the budget.
The second exception is the negative coefficient of the expenditure on property invest-
ment (column 6), and relatedly the loss in revenue from capital (column 10). Although,
international evidence to cross-validate the results is non-existent, there is an interesting
parallel between the two exceptions. Both personnel expenditure and property invest-
ment are expenditures targeted at certain groups of voters, i.e. public employees and
future property owners, respectively. If these results are true, they might be evidence of
a phenomenon that is more general than the one described by Matsusaka (2009). Un-
der direct democracy, voters have increased powers to limit the amount of government
spending going to targeted minorities (often protected by interest groups, for example)
to the benefit of the wider electorate.
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4.5 Robustness Tests
As the title suggests, this final sub-section aims at validating the accuracy of the results
with several robustness tests.
Tables 9 and 10 present the estimations first on expenditure and revenue, and then on
taxes and budget balances. The first column is an OLS specification of Equation 1 where
the endogenous direct democracy variable is simply included in the right hand side. Then
I specify three variants of the previous 2SLS with different set of instruments. In all cases
the different 2SLS estimations yield identical results suggesting that the results are not
sensitive to the choice of instruments. With the exception of the regression on budget
deficits, 2SLS estimates also yield results that are consistent to that of OLS estimations.
Finally, in the last columns in the panels of each of the dependent variables I specify a
control function (CF) method. Here, the idea is to adequately treat the binary nature of
the endogenous variable, as opposed to the 2SLS regressions which estimate linear func-
tions in both of the stages. This standard 2SLS approach, that ignores the discreteness
of the endogenous variable, as suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2008) is not incorrect
and is certainly widely applied.23 The control function approach, however, could lead to
more efficient estimates as suggested by Imbens and Wooldridge (2007). Intuitively, the
idea behind the two-step control function approach is to express the second-stage error,
2, with the first-stage error term, 1. Because the unexplained part of 2 is correlated
with the endogenous variable, DirectDemocracy, I want to directly “control” for this
bias by including 1 as an explanatory variable in the second-stage equation. Although
this error term is unknown, one can substitute for its fitted values coming from first-stage
probit estimates.
In cases of expenditure, revenue and budget balances the control function approach
does not yield significant results for the direct democracy variable. The results are con-
sistent with my previous results only in the two tax regressions. In any case, Imbens
23Some well known application are, for example, Angrist (1990) or Imbens and Klaauw (1995). Angrist
and Krueger (2001) has a brief summary of other similar works and Angrist (2001) extends the discussion
to cases where the (second-stage) dependent variable is also limited.
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and Wooldridge (2007) point to efficiency gains of the CF approach as opposed to the
standard 2SLS techniques, but also warn against its lack of robustness and its sensitivity
to specification. In my sample, the potential efficiency gains do not materialize.
5 Conclusions
In this paper I extend the literature on the fiscal effects of direct democracy to all German
municipalities. I exploit the fact that in mid-1990s most German States have indepen-
dently gone through a series of reforms introducing non-identical institutions of direct
democracy at the local level. These between-state variations in direct democratic insti-
tutions, as well the resulting observable initiatives and referenda, are used to study the
causal effect of direct democracy on fiscal outcomes.
A number of interesting results emerge. First, the analysis shows that direct democ-
racy causes an expansion of local government size by up to 8% (3%) in annual per capita
expenditure and revenue per observed initiative on economic (infrastructural) projects.
This result is in contrast to most evidence from Switzerland or the US. However, a cross-
country comparison of results is not straightforward since the institutional context (both
in direct democratic and fiscal institutions) is quite different from country to country.
As discussed by Asatryan et al. (2013) - that finds similar expansionary impact of direct
democracy based on quasi-experimental evidence from the German State of Bayern - a
plausible explanation is the German cooperative form of federalism that induces strong
common-pool disincentives on part of local voters which are then realized through initia-
tives and referenda.
Another interpretation - albeit not a direct empirical test - that I develop throughout
the paper, is the property of the so called fiscal-taboo common to all state legislations on
direct democracy in Germany. While these reforms granted German voters the right to
set the agenda and directly vote on projects of their own choice, they neither gave the
right to veto governments’ fiscal decisions, nor the responsibility to necessarily vote on
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the implied costs of these initiatives. Theory and evidence, however, suggests that it is
precisely the citizens’ right to veto government’s spending decisions - and not any kind
of direct democracy such as the right of the initiative - that serves as the mechanism to
constrain its over-spending bias. It should then not be surprising to observe a reversed
effect of direct democracy when the primary direct mechanism is blocked by law, since
this exclusion restriction significantly weakens the voters’ powers to act as a watchdog (to
block inefficient government spending decisions). On a more practical level, politicians’
reluctance of insisting on the fiscal taboo because of the voters’ assumed intrinsically
selfish, non-mature or even irresponsible behavior regarding their voting pattern on bud-
getary issues – but not on other issues – might well be the reason of these divergent
cross-country results.
Secondly, I find that this expansion of government size is (at least partly) financed
by increased local taxes and not through budget deficits. In my context this evidence
may imply that voters are demanding more public goods by exploiting their right of
the initiative, but, importantly, are not resistant in bearing the costs of providing these
additional units of local public goods.
Third, I show that the positive effects on government’s aggregate expenditures and
revenues can be replicated for most of the budget items separately. An interesting ex-
ception emerges though. The data tells that expenditures on personnel and on property
investment are negatively affected by direct democracy. One argument could be that
under direct democracy voters have increased powers to limit the amount of government
spending going to targeted minorities (e.g. public employees and future property own-
ers) to the benefit of the wider electorate. Regarding public employees, for example, the
initiative process enables individuals and groups outside the government to check the
behavior of elected officials, who often tend to pad the public payroll with patronage
workers (Matsusaka, 2009). Beyond its interest, I argue that this exception may also
serve as another step in understanding the possibly reversing effect of the fiscal-taboo.
The argument is that initiatives aimed at constraining public sector employment function
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through the same (above described) general mechanism of voters vetoing government’s
(employment) decisions. Unlike direct initiatives on the budget, however, these are in
principle not excluded from the allowed topics (even though these might have non-zero
implications for the budget).
To conclude, this paper should be viewed as a first step in understanding the fiscal
effects of German direct democracy reforms and an important complement to the Swiss
and US evidence. It is important to keep in mind that these elements of direct democ-
racy are a relatively recent institutional innovation for the German fiscal system, and
for its voters and politicians alike. Furthermore, these institutions are still evolving and
the legislations are being reformed (e.g. abolition of the fiscal-taboo in Bremen (2009),
liberalization of legislative and procedural barriers in Thu¨ringen (2009) and in Schleswig-
Holstein (2013), etc). Therefore, there is certainly a need for more research in the area.
Future work should, among other things, assess the ongoing reforms, attempt to directly
test for some of the interpretations of the results of this paper, and extend the discus-
sion beyond purely fiscal phenomena to cover other relevant economic effects of direct
democracy.
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Figure 1: Frequency and topics of local initiatives across German La¨nder
Notes: Total number of local initiatives across German La¨nder per topic, and their success rate in
2002-2009.
Figure 2: Costs of local initiatives and their topics
Notes: Relative amount of local initiatives and their topics across proposed cost categories (in thousand
Euros) in German La¨nder from 2002 to 2009.
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Table 7: The structure of budget expenditure and revenue for an average town
Expenditure or Revenue Category Euro, thousand Share
Total Expenditure 15,600 1.00
Administrative, of which 12,200 0.78
Operating 2,532 0.16
Personnel 3,341 0.21
Capital, of which 3,400 0.22
Property Investment 1,772 0.11
Total Revenue 14,700 1.00
Administrative, of which 12,200 0.83
Own taxes 3,272 0.22
Capital 2,536 0.17
Source: Own calculations based on data from “Statistik Lokal” database.
Sample: All German municipalities, 2002-2009 (unweighted averages).
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